related education is fundamentally lacking. This paper proposes possible remedies as well as relevant topics that AFRC leadership should consider when refining its vision and mission. AFRC should entertain a litany of strategically introspective questions focusing on utilization of the continuum of service, career cross-pollination, the creation of a strategic initiative group, and empowering and developing a culture based on leadership. As with any strategic level organizational transformation, success and failure hinge upon the lynchpin of leadership to imbue and endorse the change. Hence, fostering cross-culturally savvy leadership with coup d'oiel is quintessential to success.
The subject matter of this paper can be levied as a proposed CORONA topic from AFRC.
COMMAND CLAIRVOYANCE: STRATEGICALLY TRANSFORMING AFRC THROUGH TOTAL FORCE AND LEADERSHIP
Senior leaders manage transformation.
-General Martin Dempsey 1 Based on the supposition that transformational organizational change is often a bifurcated path, with change either occurring incrementally through a gradual realization of cultural evolution and necessity, or that transformational organizational change is kindled by a significant catalyst that galvanizes awareness in order to motivate change, the author developed a variegated list of potential actions that Air Force Reserve
Command (AFRC) should consider to best adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape. 2, 3, 4 Preemptively implementing many of these changes will best position AFRC to avoid an external catalyst from dictating other unwanted-and perhaps draconian-changes. Due to the nature of "bureaucratic inertia," the author advocates examination of all these subjects simultaneously, based on the fact that the viability of implementing these options will be driven by a multitude of factors. 5, 6 Hence, the multifarious options listed, along with multifaceted approaches, will enable AFRC leadership to choose the options most conducive to the enterprise"s vision and mission, and perhaps contribute to refining the vision and mission to reflect the dynamic domestic and international domains within which AFRC operates. 7 Moreover, these recommended changes will add utility not just to AFRC, but to the Active Duty Air Force, the Air Reserve Component (ARC), our sister services, and ideally to our nation"s ability to "fight and win" wars. 8 This treatise defines national level desiderata that guide AFRC toward pursuing options to optimize its contributions-in conjunction with the Air Force-to the Total Force Enterprise (TFE). This monograph"s primary focus is based upon examining AFRC through the lens of the Total Force Initiative (TFI) and identifying ways to find synergy and leverage to maximize the return on investment for American taxpayers. Starting from national strategic guidance, TFI is reevaluated to examine some existing shortfalls, and offer remedies that focus on education, culture, and leadership. Other organizational adaptations such as career cross-pollination, continuum of service, and the creation of a Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) are nominated and addressed for feasibility and significance of potential contributions to AFRC. The conglomeration of topics shares the common thread of organizational transformation, and hinges on the need for visionary leadership to clearly discern precise methods of implementation.
The Need for Change
The fiscal impetus for transformational change was clearly framed by the previous Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, in two key statements. "Let me be clear, the task before us is not to reduce the department"s top line budget. Rather, it is to significantly reduce its excess overhead costs and apply the savings to force structure and modernization." 9 By coupling this comment by Secretary Gates with his comments on the Total Force, AFRC has some relatively clear guidance from the National strategic level, "The Congress, the Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves, and the Department all recognize that the National Guard and the Reserves are integral to the Total Force and have assumed a greater operational role in today"s force." 10 Marrying these two comments together, one can infer that the United States military needs to save money, and that the National Guard and Reserves are cost effective enabling mediums. The same themes resonate from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 11 This continuity was echoed by the current Secretary of 3 Defense, Leon Panetta, who testified before the House Armed Services Committee and stated, "Our challenge is taking a force that has been involved in a decade of war and ensuring that we build the military we need to defend our country for the next decade even at a time of fiscal austerity." 12 It thus behooves these military services to transform as required to effectively meet these national priorities. Some of the programs outlined above are already in progress, some require implementation, and all require leadership and fresh thinking. We cannot know what the future holds, so in order to realize my vision of a consistently powerful, capable Air Force, we will almost certainly need to pursue initiatives not yet fully imagined. 13 The CSAF updated this vector in July, 2011, reiterating the budgetary constraints:
In the coming years our Nation and our Air Force will face a budget environment unlike anything we have encountered in decades. As elected officials consider what to do about the growing federal debt, pressure will mount to reduce defense spending…We must move ahead, continually sustaining and renewing the Air Force"s unique, asymmetric, and vital contributions to national security. ACC and the ARC each had epiphanies tied to the fact that organizational divisions needed to be aligned commensurate with existing UTCs. Resolution won"t be simple because current UMDs aren"t in alignment with this construct. However, involved
MAJCOMs are working to resolve this issue. 28 Due to TFI being focused on the expeditionary mindset, much of the Active Duty scrutiny of TFI I-Plans and CONOPs focuses on the concept of volunteerism instead of mobilization, and ties into ARC culture. 29 Unfortunately, the concept is relatively easy to misconstrue without detailed examination of legislation. This subject matter is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it is this author"s opinion that AFRC should forgo writing assumed volunteerism percentages into any TFI documents because AFRC is often held to these misconstrued and arbitrary numbers by Active Duty perception. 30 Unfortunately, this relatively opaque guidance, when viewed through the lens of different cultures, has created a few TFI apostates who no longer endeavor to make TFI work.
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These TFI iconoclasts in turn represent a cultural undercurrent that is a major impediment to TFI success from either the host unit or tenant unit perspective. There is a causal linkage to the fact that the TFI endeavor left its port without being adequately resourced or equipped in some instances. Cultural resistance to TFI is apparent from both the Active Duty and the ARC. Resistance from the ARC is often due to the heritage and legacy of units and the longer duration of personnel, some of whom are entrenched in a previous paradigm. Breaking this vestigial cultural resistance is a major obstacle that is best accomplished through proper selection of wing leadership and below for both the Active Duty and the ARC. 31 Resistance from the Active Duty often
emanates from a lack of understanding and education on Reserve culture.
The author acknowledges that perceived success in the TFI domain, although subjective, varies significantly from the MAF to the CAF. This goes back to the topic of organizational transformation. AFRC associations have been integrated into the MAF since 1968, and have had multiple generations of cultural evolution since that time. and is iteratively progressing toward TFI as portions of the FAP program sunset. 33 The emergence of CAF TFI has been coincident with a significant reduction in the CAF, resulting in competition that further complicates the issue. The author intends to highlight the temporal difference between the MAF, without assigning causality.
Acculturation and assimilation into a cohesive operation occurs with cultural turnover. 34 Cultural change takes time, leadership, vision, and action. Oliver Recklies states:
In summary, the rules for cultural implementation of a merger [are] as follows: To impose an unwanted culture is a good solution in very few cases. Integrating cultures are much harder to achieve; however, in the long term they promise much better results.
Leadership Meets and Molds Culture
As previously alluded to, the success of TFI hinges on personalities which pivot on leadership and understanding culture. It is very difficult to accurately lead and navigate without a holistic cognizance of your organizational constitution. 35 If TFI has been perceived as failing at any particular locale, the author attributes this failure to an inchoate process of educating leaders about the intricacies of TFI before placing them in this domain. This holds true for both the Active Duty and AFRC. At the heart of this lie the cultural cornerstones that distinguish the subtleties of each organization. The vast preponderance of reservists was previously Active Duty. 36 Generally, reservists understand the Active Duty paradigm, although it has shifted incessantly during the last two decades. However, very few Active Duty officers have been members of the ARC, and this can correlate to (not implied causality) a lack of understanding of the ARC"s culture, directives, and modus operandi. This fundamental premise can often lead to biases and assumptions that preclude accurate TFI decisions.
One facet of addressing this shortfall is through formalized education, and not merely learning on the job. Ill-prepared leaders who learn on the job can succeed, but the Air Force and AFRC would be best served by objectively educating these individuals prior to their tenure in associations. Ill-prepared leaders can inadvertently erode organizational trust and detrimentally affect command climate, which takes significant time to be reinvigorated at an organizational level. 37 In essence, education should at a minimum aid all TFI participants in finding an operational modus Vivendi. 38 Air Force TFI leadership needs to remember Thomas Jefferson"s profound statement, "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle," and reconcile differences to accomplish the mission. 39 Leadership and education are the bricks and mortar that will hold the operation together.
Education"s ability to affect and transform organizational cultures is not immediate. There is an acknowledged dilatory temporal aspect. Cultural change is generally gradual, subtle, iterative, and incremental. 40 In context, TFI involves more than just putting the correct ingredients together, and hoping that the recipe succeeds. Mathematically, the odds are against it. TFI requires leadership who recognize the holistic involvement of multiple parts, and how to correctly influence their interaction. There are various strata of TFI. AFRC needs to have a bottom up perspective, evaluating the success of TFI from the systemic perceptions of its empowered wing commanders, not by merely analyzing metrics. 45 The qualitative assessments of AFRC"s leaders are more insightful than numerical metrics.
Peter Senge advocates creating "learning-oriented cultures" as a vehicle to enable culture to be resilient, flexible, and adaptable to changing environmental stimuli. 46 This learning culture needs to permeate the collective masses that constitute the organization"s culture and be all-encompassing. This too is a bottom up approach that will enable AFRC to develop another generation of TFI savvy leaders. Aligned with General Stenner"s previous comments, AFRC needs to foster an "adaptive culture" in order to meet the impending transformational change requirements and to develop organizational "leadership and lifelong learning" to succeed. 47 In Leading Change, John Kotter emphasizes the importance of a learning culture:
This means that over the next few decades we will see both a new form of organization emerge to cope with faster-moving and more competitive environments and a new kind of employee, at least in successful firms. 55 This white paper was accurate and comprehensive, although it didn"t address the domain of TFI and the importance of education tailored to TFI operations.
General Looney stated two key assumptions: first, "The Air Force will innovate and change its approach to education and training to effectively prepare future Airmen to perform successfully;" and second, "…approaches to education and training will account for…the future environment in which Airmen operate." 56 From a Total Force perspective, two important points manifest: The Air Force intends to utilize education to optimize performance, and they will do so based on their anticipated operational environment. That being so, why did AETC not recognize the (TFI) associations that define significant portions of its current and future environment?
Referencing previous CJCS guidance promulgated in 2005 by General Peter
Pace, the term "total force" is not mentioned. 57 Granted, the Chairman"s focus was "to develop a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that links joint officer development to the overall missions and goals of the Department of Defense." 58 The previous Chairman"s white paper goes on to essentially formulate baseline U.S. policy on educating military"s members. This paper established a common thread of continuity that still is the baseline resonating throughout U.S.
military education. The Chairman cogently recognized the importance of a continuum of education, especially via strategically minded, critical thinking, and jointly educated officers. 59 The integration of Reserve and National Guard complements is inadvertently omitted, perhaps due to the assumption that this integration was a refined process.
However, General Pace did state that "the services maintain the responsibility to set and develop competencies to meet their own Service-specific roles, missions, and capabilities." 60 With this in mind, the author advocates that the Air Force, integrated with AFRC, and perhaps the ANG, develop mutually beneficial TFI-related educational initiatives.
A merely cursory analysis of curricula instructed through most professional military education programs rather quickly reveals that Reserve subject matter is relatively short-sighted, and inadequate in terms of applicable utility. Curricula generally focus on comprehending the conceptual basis of our military"s Reserve components, without addressing the particular nuances that our leaders will be required to understand, command, lead, and implement in today"s Total Force Enterprise. Although the various branches of the military tailor the curricula slightly differently, all branches of the military would be best served by incorporating this as a fundamental premise. Reserve officers for the leadership positions they will encumber in the ever-growing domain of TFI and associations, revision of curricula and syllabi to reflect current shortfalls is paramount.
Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1800.01D recognizes the importance of the Total
Force, by stating that "The success of PME relies on leadership's ability to…ensure that
proper attention is given to total force requirements relative to PME." 62 "JPME should position an officer to recognize and operate in tactical, operational, and strategic levels of national security, enhancing the total force capability and capacity to wage, as necessary, traditional and irregular warfare." 63 The Instruction goes on to state, "The twenty-first century total force must train [and be educated] to adaptability, agility, and relevance." 64 However, beyond this stated guidance, there is a perceived gap between the theory of total force education and designing, implementing, and utilizing total force education to improve organizational efficiencies. This gap manifests in TFI.
It is here that the focus will be refined from the joint level to the Air Force, AFRC, and Air University. Potential subject matter to be incorporated by Air University must be closely vetted by experienced senior leaders from AFRC and the Active Duty Air Force.
Ideally these members would have experience under the crucible of an associate unit, on either side of the equation, be it an active or classic associate unit. Determining the exact curriculum or curricula will best be determined via a cadre of experienced Active . 66 Yet, the curricula are different among the senior service schools. The differences among curricula manifest the ability to change certain portions of what the schools are teaching, while still satisfying the requisites associated with the JPME Phase II credit. This means that the schools have the option to tailor certain curricula and syllabi to accommodate their service-specific needs, or the needs that they feel provide the most relevant leverage to their students, in conjunction with their follow-on assignments, especially regarding electives.
One possible remedy to address the shortfalls of TFI related education would be to develop electives that detail the operational leadership challenges associated with the marriage of Active and Reserve components. 67 This class would need to go beyond the conceptual level cognizance of TFI, and permeate down to the previously described level of details associated with operational oversight. It is ironic that in order to have the intended strategic affect on the parent organizations, the course will need to get into the operational and tactical level nuances of each culture. However, without this level of intricate detail, leaders will probably be ill-equipped to deal with some of the unique challenges of TFI associations.
A natural segue is to require that certain jobs have a particular schooling prerequisite. For instance, joint billets will usually require students to attend joint schooling prior to filling the billet. 68 Along these same lines, it would be wise to send those officers-both Active Duty and Reserve-who will be filling leadership positions in our Associate units through a course that covers subject matter related to the TFI. This course could either be incorporated into the developmental education (DE) of the respective service, or it could be an abbreviated course that focuses on subject matter 19 to which this paper alludes. The requirement is absolutely imperative as an underpinning to success in the TFI realm. The choice of incorporating the subject matter into all DE or into a focused course should be levied upon the Air University faculty, AFRC, ANG, and AF senior leaders to discuss at CORONA. 69 Hence, the subject matter of this paper can be levied as a proposed CORONA topic from AFRC.
In something that has yet to be implemented. Synergies can further be leveraged by coupling this personnel reciprocation with tailored education. AFRC is on the vanguard of researching, and enacting such a personnel system, although the focus and the intent of the program is primarily aimed at career development than at the TFI facet.
With that being said, the tenet of TFI experience will inherently prove complementary to career development and must be integrated into the process.
Career broadening assignments should undergo evaluation to ensure that they are no longer vestigial and based on an obsolete paradigm of career progression. Both AFRC and the Active Duty need to revisit their current templates on career progression.
Even military career paradigms will experience significant and multiple metamorphoses of sorts during the span of the next 20-30 years, accelerated through technological advancements. Requisite career "hurdles" should be validated to make certain that they actually are contributory to officer development. Most importantly, progression guidance needs to anticipate changes in the organizational mission to best position "high potential officers" for subsequent career responsibilities. 74 Moving officers through space and cyber tours, as well as the education that they will receive, will enable a larger portion of the force to evolve commensurately with technological propagation into these domains. Pilots prove unique, due to the substantial monetary investment 22 associated with their initial training. However, in order to reach the pinnacle of the "career pyramid," a fundamental understanding and fluency in the Air, Space, and Cyber domains is quintessential for Active Duty and Reserve officers. 75 Since AFRC inherits a large portion of the Active Duty Air Force, this argument also applies to AFRC. More than likely, AFRC aircrew members will propagate from piloting into these emerging domains as a one-way street due to the longevity of their careers. However, balanced with rated requirements, the Active Duty should definitely consider integrating UAS, space, and cyber tours for pilots, high potential officers, and enlisted members, after resolving current manning shortfalls. U.S. Air Forces Central
Command (AFCENT) Commander, Lieutenant General David Goldfein, recognized the importance of this and lead by example by getting checked out in the MQ-9 (Reaper) while at ACC. 76 
Continuum of Service
In light of recent "Defense Budgetary Review Board" comments on issues associated with the military pay and retirement system, the continuum of service is an extremely relevant subject. 77 Again we see the need for AFRC and the Active Duty Air In a contemporary sense coup d'oiel is a grand vision, and the capability to conceptualize how the dynamic interaction of multiple, competing systems will likely play out. 88 The focus for AFRC is more on TFI and the budgetary battlefields. Leaders will need the acumen to discern quickly and clearly how to exploit this vision into a competitive advantage that will play out both on the battlefield, or in Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE). This visionary capability to 26 see, shape, and influence the future is a comprehensive leadership trait that AFRC needs to instill in its A5A8 (strategic plans, requirements, and programming) personnel, as well as in a Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG). 89 Strategic leaders have to rely on savoir faire in order to charismatically galvanize the organization to transform itself. This is not an easy task; there are no recipes for success. Each situation is unique-especially when the AFI regarding TFI explains that TFI will be different for each wing and weapons system. The onus of institutionalizing the change permeates through wing, group, and squadron leadership. The best strategic leaders find ways to utilize cultural and emotional inertia to their advantage. 95 Thus, just as these trends can spawn productive cultural phenomena, they can also breed unintentional inter-service mission and budgetary conflicts.
With that in mind, AFRC has some key questions it needs to ask itself in order to reevaluate its vision for the dynamics of the 21 st century: How can we optimize our TFI relationships? Does professional military education (PME) accurately portray our role in Based on fiscal reality, this group could be constituted "out of hide." A cadre of skilled individuals within the SIG is a requisite, and further points to the absolute importance of career development, education, mentoring, and strategic leadership fostering within the AFRC community. More than anything else, this very subject matter accentuates the need to nurture strategic level thinkers and leaders on par with Active Duty Air Force.
AFRC evolution into force management, force development, and education is on the right track. However, there are a few areas that have yet to be adequately developed.
Conclusion
Organizational alignment is absolutely imperative for organizations during times of a decreasing budget. 96, 97 AFRC needs to scan its internal and external environment, envision multiple futures, and ponder how the organization can proactively adapt to the changing environment in a manner which provides a sustainable and unique competitive advantage to U.S. taxpayers. In essence, AFRC needs to find niche markets in which its personnel composition is uniquely suited, and can exploit its asymmetric capabilities. In so doing, AFRC will optimize its contributions to the National
Military Strategy of the United States.
In synopsis, the best things that AFRC can do is to focus on influencing and crafting transformational change on the items that will have the most leveraged contributions to operations. The author asserts that culturally educating all facets of TFI will optimize the total force and yield the most marginal utility. There are a multitude of potential options for actually implementing TFI-related education and the intention of this paper has been predominantly focused on identifying this shortfall and discussing conceptually based solutions that adhere to doctrinal guidance. Hence, this paper should serve as a stimulant for discussion for senior Air Force and ARC leaders who can subsequently refine courses of action. As the primary resonating frequency, TFIrelated education can be melodically complemented by reevaluating other "harmonics" such as career cross-pollination, the continuum of service, transportability of service, and developing leaders who have coup d'oiel and are cross-culturally savvy in the broadest sense. 98 Melding all of the above indicates that AFRC could also be well served by creating a strategic initiative group of leaders who could independently ratiocinate on potential strategic issues independent of existing organizational structure, duties, and process. Above all else, this paper is not prescriptive; rather it can be utilized by AFRC leadership who can subsequently "target and sort" according to their execution matrix, vision, and timeline. 99 The ultimate goal is the longevity and prosperity of AFRC as a solid contributor to the Air Force and the defense of the United States. Winston
Churchill, one of the world"s greatest visionary leaders, stated, "The empires of the future will be empires of the mind." 100 It is incumbent upon AFRC leadership to embrace such a vision as it envisions and determines its own future. 
